Abstract. We study how peers impact worker productivity growth among salespeople in the cosmetics department of a department store. We first exploit a shift assignment policy that creates exogenous variation in salespersons' peers each week to identify and quantify sources of worker learning. We find that peer-based learning is more important than learning-by-doing for individuals, and find no evidence of forgetting. Working with high-ability peers substantially increases the long-term productivity growth of new salespeople. We then examine possible mechanisms behind peer-based learning by exploiting the multiple collocated firms in our setting that sell products with different task difficulties, and compensate their sales force using either team-based or individual-based compensation systems. The variation in incentives to compete and cooperate within and across firm boundaries, combined with variation in sales difficulty for different product classes, allows us to suggest two mechanisms behind peer-based learning: observing successful sales techniques of peers and direct teaching. Our paper advocates the importance of learning from one another in the workplace, and suggests that individual peer-based learning is a foundation of both organizational learning curves and knowledge spillovers across firms.
A well-developed literature in economics and management studies learning curves at the group and organizational level. The primary focus of the research has been on identifying learning-by-doing through cost decreases with cumulative production (Arrow 1962; Thompson 2001) , as well as organizational forgetting in periods of low production (Darr et al. 1995; Benkard 2000; Thompson 2007 ). We have little evidence, however, on underlying individual mechanisms that generate this phenomenon (Adler and Clark 1991) . While individual learning-by-doing through experimentation and observation of own outcomes is a common explanation for productivity growth (Blume and Franco 2007) , social learning theory suggests peers may also play a critical role (Ellison and Fudenberg 1993; Bala and Goyal 1998; Young 2009 ). This peer-based learning can involve both observing peers' practices and active teaching by peers (Arrow 1994) . Despite evidence of peer-based learning in education (Sacerdote 2001), crime (Bayer et al. 2009 ), health care (KC et al. 2013) , and economic development (Bandiera and Rasul 2006) , direct evidence in commercial and industrial settings is rare.
In this paper we dissect the separate roles of peer-based learning and individual learning-by-doing (and forgetting) in the productivity change of salespeople, with learning from peers as our primary focus. We extend this focus to study peer-based learning across firm boundaries, motivated by more macro-level evidence of knowledge transfer across firms ), store locations (Darr et al. 1995) , and work shifts (Epple et al. 1996) . Exploiting firm boundaries also helps disentangle the mechanisms that might drive peer-based learning. Our empirical setting is four years of individual sales data for 92 salespeople working at 11 co-located cosmetics counters in a department store. This research setting matches our research agenda because multiple cosmetics manufacturers employ salespeople at counters on the same retail floor, allowing us to observe peer-based learning both within and across firms. More importantly, the difficult task of selling cosmetics products with often unobservable quality makes learning from peers critical for productivity growth.
We conceptualize the sales task in the cosmetics counters as a stochastic production function with parameters linking output (sales) with input (selling activities) variables. Salespeople have heterogeneous selling abilities based on different knowledge levels of these parameters which in turn translate into unique individual sales productivities. 2 The parameters are particularly unknown to new salespeople, who must learn their values to increase sales. While these values could in principle be learned by experimenting with inputs and observing outcomes (Easley and Kiefer 1988) , such a learning-by-doing process is likely to be slow in our setting because selling cosmetics products involves high-dimensional parameters. Furthermore, the short-term cost of failure (i.e., lost sales commissions) may dissuade salespeople from experimenting with inputs. We argue that a more effective learning strategy is to observe peers and to seek their instruction on the optimal activities, i.e., learning from peers.
To identify peer-based learning, we exploit the store's pseudo-random worker shift assignment, which creates exogenous changes in the weekly pool of a given salesperson's peers. This primary variation of shift assignment is complemented by other shocks including leaves of absence and a counter relocation. These exogenous peer variations help address potential concerns of strategic worker assignment, reflection, and mean reversion. Based on these data features, we first use a regression that specifically controls for both firms selecting salespeople based on initial ability and learning potential of newly-hired salespeople to show evidence of new salespeople learning from high-ability peers, within and across counters. We then build a more comprehensive model allowing a salesperson's selling ability in any period to depend on knowledge accumulated from past interaction with peers, learning-by-doing, and forgetting.
Our estimation results show that learning from peers at the same and adjacent counters is critical to the productivity growth of new salespeople. Learning-by-doing plays a lesser role, and forgetting is insignificant. A new salesperson working alone for forty hours in her first week would improve her future sales by two percent. If she were to work constantly with a within-counter peer of twice her ability, her sales productivity would grow by an additional five to six percent in the next week. A simultaneously-staffed peer of twice her ability at an adjacent competing counter would generate an additional productivity growth of one to one-and-a-half percent.
The existence of firm boundaries, different product types and various compensation systems in our setting allows us to illustrate and dissect two mechanisms of peer-based learning. While some knowledge may be learned through direct observation, products that are more difficult to sell may require active teaching from peers, a process unlikely across firm boundaries because of incentives to compete. Specifically, we compare the peer-based learning of salespeople when selling two product subcategories of different task difficulty -skin care and makeup. Skin care products, as credence goods (Darby and Karni 1973) , are more difficult to sell than makeup products, for which efficacy is immediately visible. We find that for skin care products, cross-counter learning is far weaker than learning from within-counter peers; while for makeup products the two effects are similar. We argue that salespeople can learn from observing simpler tasks, thereby making cross-counter peers viable knowledge sources. Teaching from within-counter peers is essential for more complicated tasks. We also find that salespeople at individual-based counters learn more from cross-counter peers than their team-based peers, suggesting that financial incentives may induce salespeople to invest different levels of time and effort toward active learning.
We examine alternative explanations for our model estimates, including customer loyalty, peer effects in work ethic, mean reversion, and data aggregation issues, and present evidence that these alternative hypotheses cannot explain our results. We also conduct interviews with department store salespeople in both China and the United States, which provide further evidence validating the learning mechanisms that we argue. Finally, we conduct two counterfactual experiments to demonstrate the economic value of retaining star salespeople and maintaining team heterogeneity in worker shift assignments, both generated from enhancing peer-based learning for newly-hired salespeople.
The peer-based learning investigated in this study substantially differs from the "peer effect" identified in previous work (e.g. Mas and Moretti 2009; Nair et al. 2010; . use a dataset from the same source to investigate how compensation impacts peer effect, but they only examine the contemporaneous effect of peers on a salesperson's sales, assuming that the salesperson's ability is stable over time. In contrast, this study focuses on how peer-based learning helps increase ability. Peers thus have a long-term impact on worker productivity not observed in previous peer effect studies. Furthermore, our results show that although competing with high-ability peers can have an immediate negative impact on sales ), these same high-ability competitors can provide future benefits to a new salesperson's sales through learning. This study, therefore, complements the previous work on peer effects and helps offer a more complete picture of the dynamics of workplace interaction. This study also suggests that the cohort effects observed in education (e.g. Black et al. 2013 ) may have widespread parallels in commercial and industrial settings.
The challenge to estimating this learning effect is that the contemporaneous peer effect will be accumulated as "human capital" that influences future sales. Consequently, we must rely on a new identification and estimation strategy that is also different from the previous peer effect studies.
This study has important implications for the marketing literature on learning and sales force management. While the marketing literature on learning focuses on consumer or customer learning on brand attributes and product quality (e.g., Meyer and Sathi 1985; Erdem and Keane 1996; Erdem 1998; Narayanan et al. 2007; Narayanan and Manchanda 2009) , we show that learning is also highly important in those who serve consumers, and peer-based learning is a critical source of learning among salespeople.
The few economics and marketing papers on learning from others have all focused on consumers (Cai et al. 2009; Ching 2010; Zhang 2010) , and also primarily assumed that consumers can only observe others' choices (e.g., where they eat) but not the outcomes (e.g., their satisfaction with the meal). This study observes both salespeople's inputs (i.e., sales efforts) and the corresponding outputs (i.e., sales), and hence, is able to make a more direct inference on learning from others. 3 Furthermore, our paper is the first to our knowledge in economics, marketing, or management to empirically deconstruct organizational learning to both individual experience-based and peer-based processes.
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Sales forces are undoubtedly critical components of marketing in both B2C and B2B environments (Kotler and Keller 2008) . With three times the amount spent on sales forces as on advertising (Zoltners et al. 2008) , and over 20 million Americans (Albers et al. 2008 ) and 65 million Chinese employed as salespeople, 5 improving the sales force productivity is critical for managers. Most studies of sales force management assume independence among salespeople (e.g., Basu et al. 1985; Coughlan and Sen 1989; Lal and Srinivasan 1993; Joseph and Kalwani 1998; Godes 2003) . However, as Mantrala et al. (2010) explain, we know little about how worker interactions such as knowledge-sharing impact productivity.
Our results suggest that in settings where salespeople are collocated (e.g. department store) or compete for the same customers (e.g. pharmaceutical sales), they can significantly influence one another's longterm productivity. Consequently, team heterogeneity and turnover both have persistent impacts on firm performance.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 discusses the empirical setting. Section 2 conceptualizes salesperson learning from experience and peers. Section 3 presents initial evidence supporting peer-based learning and our identification conditions. Section 4 develops a comprehensive empirical model of salesperson learning. Section 5 presents the estimation results and discusses the underlying mechanisms of our findings of peer-based learning. Section 6 concludes.
I. Empirical Setting
Our empirical setting is cosmetic sales in a department store in a large metropolitan area in Eastern
China. This department store is one of the largest in China in both sales and profit and has 15 major 4 There is a related literature on learning and knowledge transfer, but no studies dynamically model experience-and peerbased learning at the individual level. Azoulay et al. (2010) and Oettl (2012) observe contemporaneous knowledge-based peer effects among scientists. Others infer knowledge transfer by linking improved team performance with team tenure Pisano et al. 2001; Huckman et al. 2009 ). Sociological work also infers knowledge transfer through worker network structure (Ingram and Roberts 2000; Reagans and McKevily 2003) . 5 China Statistical Yearbook 2010 . China Statistics Press, 2010 brands in its cosmetics department. Each of the brands occupies a counter on the same floor and hires their own salespeople to promote and sell its products, while paying the department store a share of their revenues. The cosmetics floor area effectively becomes an open market, with multiple firms competing for customers in a shared space. This retailing system is a prevalent practice in China (Li et al. 2010) , and is becoming more common in the United States (Jerath and Zhang 2010) . 6 In our setting, the department store sets the counter locations and schedules the worker shifts. We observe cosmetic sales for 11 of the 15 counters over a four-year period (January 1, 2003 -December 31, 2006 .
Descriptive statistics for these brands are summarized in Table 1 . The counters vary both in average price and total revenue. The 11 brands in our data use two different compensation systems: team-based commissions (TC) and individual-based commissions (IC).
Selling cosmetics is far more challenging than selling other categories such as groceries. Given the average item price of CNY114 (see Table 1 ), cosmetics are luxury products for most Chinese consumers, especially during the sample period. Customers have unique product needs; even for the same product (e.g. lipstick) there are many colors and scents that customers evaluate differently. A newly-hired salesperson must learn the many product attributes and how they match customers with unique needs. She must also be patient but persuasive dealing with customers. Interviews with the store manager reveal that the selling process can last an entire hour before a customer makes a decision.
There are two major cosmetic categories: skin care and makeup. Skin care products are typically more expensive than makeup products (average prices at CNY124 and CNY89, respectively). While customers can immediately verify the benefits of makeup in improving appearance, the value of skin care products are only observable through long-term use. Most Chinese customers seek "whitening" and "smoothing" benefits from skin care, which may not be obvious even after long-term use, making skin care products credence goods (Darby and Karni 1973) . The information asymmetry of credence goods creates moral hazard (Emons 1997) , making customers cautious in buying. Salespeople must be skillful in order to justify the products' high prices. Our interviews with cosmetics salespeople and managers in both China and the United States consistently revealed that selling skin care products is more challenging than selling makeup. Table 2 describes the salespeople in the data. Ninety-two female salespeople worked for the 11 brands over our time period with 44 percent turnover. Columns (3) and (4) show that 53 new salespeople enter and 41 existing workers depart. All salespeople are nearly identical demographically:
female, Han Chinese, and between 20 and 35 years old. While this homogeneity reduces concerns about endogenous sorting on worker characteristics, it also precludes us from using observable demographics to estimate selection processes. We do not observe prior working experience. Table 2 also reports the average tenure length across counters truncated on both the left and right sides of the data.
When a salesperson completes a sale, the cashier records the salesperson's unique ID, the product identity, quantities, prices, and time of sale, providing detailed data about each sale. In each counter, salespeople typically work in one of three overlapping shifts during the seven days per week the store is open: first shift from 9am to 3pm, second shift from 12pm to 6pm, and third shift from 3pm to 9pm.
The manager schedules worker shifts at the beginning of each month so as to ensure each person will rotate days and times. While many salespeople have preferences for shifts or days, they all evenly rotate each for fairness reasons. Salespeople may also have preferences for coworkers, but again for fairness reasons the manager ensures that each salesperson has an equal chance of working with other withincounter peers. The manager also stated that shifts are assigned independently across counters. Although each salesperson's time at each shift and with specific peers is roughly the same in the long run (e.g. a month), within a shorter window (e.g. a week) we observe large fluctuations in the data. These shortterm fluctuations create exogenous shocks that are important to identify peer learning.
In addition, we identify two other sources of variation in peers within and across counters that are plausibly exogenous. First, the law requires workers on average to have two days off per week. The store is open seven days per week, and weekends and public holidays such as New Year are its busiest time. It cannot let salespeople off during these days, nor do salespeople want to given their commission-based pay. Salespeople typically work for long periods without days off, using accumulated vacation for longer breaks. A salesperson on average works 181 hours per month with a standard deviation of 61 hours. Across the sample period, we observe 562 times a salesperson is absent for more than two days. The average absence is 4.5 days with a standard deviation of 5.6, and the maximum is 63 - Figure 2 plots the productivity growth of new salespeople in their first 25 weeks of service (relative to the average hourly sales in the first week). The middle curve is the non-parametric smoothed "learning curve" averaged over all new salespeople, showing that learning occurs mainly in the first three months. There is a large variation across salespeople. The curves show that the lower and upper quartiles of productivity change for all salespeople are very different. This variation is partly driven by heterogeneity in learning ability across salespeople; however, it is also partly driven by the difference in the learning process due to the variation in the pool of peers in different weeks.
Productivity Growth of New Salespeople
Figure 3 presents basic evidence that this variation in learning rates is influenced by exposure to peers. The solid dots represent the productivity growth (relative to the first week) of all new salespeople assigned more hours in the first two weeks with a "strong peer group".
8 The x's represent those assigned more hours in the first two weeks with a "weak peer group". There are large weekly productivity fluctuations due to seasonal and other factors for which we do not control; however, the productivity growth of the former group consistently exceeds the latter in the first ten weeks. The solid line, reflecting the smoothed learning curve of the "strong" peer group, and the dashed line, the smoothed learning curve of the "weak" peer group, confirm this observation. The difference diminishes over time, likely due to the random worker assignment averaging out the learning of the two groups in later weeks. Regardless, the impact of heterogeneous peer mix in the first two weeks is considerable, and suggests that peers indeed impact new salespeople' productivity in future weeks.
II. Production Function and Salesperson Learning
In this study, the selling ability of a salesperson may evolve over time through learning, thereby impacting her future sales. Suppose that there are I salespeople working for J counters in the store in week t, and that each salesperson deals with N potential customers. Salesperson i's sales revenue when selling to the n th customer, Z to capture differences in product quality and compensation for salespeople's effort. We specify the production function as the following: 
This production function demonstrates the positive relationship between a salesperson's selling ability and her (logged) weekly sales. In the empirical analysis in the next section, we will focus on the change in this weekly sales for each salesperson. 9 We assume that n it Y is continuous and left-truncated at zero (i.e. no transaction). This specification allows that a highability salesperson not only can sell more effectively but also can cross-sell other products or convince customers to buy more expensive items. For illustration purposes, this production function abstracts away from the heterogeneity of consumer needs and preferences. In reality, different production functions may be involved when dealing with different customer types; the selling task thus will be even more complicated.
Assume that a general selling process involves K activities, a 1 ,…, a K , each representing a task that may increase the chance of a successful transaction (e.g., warmly greeting customers, comparing product attributes). To maximize sales under time and effort constraints, any salesperson i must choose the optimal set of activities. Correspondingly, we specify the selling ability ˆi (2) and (3)).
To learn ψ the salesperson may experiment with different activities and update her priors based on sales outcomes. This is the learning-by-doing mechanism where time and experience allows her to experiment and hence gain better knowledge. The short-run cost of learning-by-doing, however, is that experimentation may yield lost customers and commissions, making her unwilling to experiment.
The learning process can be particularly slow for complicated job tasks with high-dimensional ψ , because the salesperson must experiment repeatedly in order to learn the true values.
Alternatively, the salesperson may observe the activities and sales outcomes from within-and cross-counter peers, 10 and use these to update ( ) F ψ . Peers with different abilities may choose different activities. If the average success rate of sales interactions among peers is low, observing high-ability peers will enable the salesperson to learn faster and achieve higher future sales. There is no risk of losing customers, but the salesperson has to exert effort to closely observe peer activities. Another peer-based learning mechanism is that peers teach the salesperson how different activities can lead to different outcomes. Thus, the knowledge of ψ is directly passed. The higher the ability a peer has, the less noise there is in the knowledge that she teaches. Such peer-based learning through teaching, however, requires effort and time from both parties. Peers must therefore have an incentive to teach, making teaching unlikely for salespeople in a competitive relationship either within or across counters.
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III. Identification and Simple Regression Results
The Identification of Learning
The above learning mechanism implies relationships between a salesperson's own work experience or peer interactions and her selling ability, which has a monotonic relationship with sales.
Since we cannot directly observe learning, our empirical strategy is to first use sales data to identify how salesperson ability changes with own work experience and peer interactions. After that, we examine whether the results are consistent with the learning mechanism, and also rule out alternative explanations for the results that are not based on peer learning.
In our empirical investigation, salesperson ability is inferred from sales in each week. Equation
(1) shows a monotonically positive relationship between sales it Y and ability ˆi t Y in week t. Two key assumptions are required to identify our empirical model. First, we assume that salesperson ability is impacted by own work experience and peer interactions from previous weeks but not from the current week. 12 Second, we assume that, because of the quasi-random worker assignment, changes in the pool of peers and shifts in each week are exogenous to worker ability and demand shocks. Extensive tests of the randomness of worker assignment, presented in the online appendix, demonstrate that both new and experienced salespeople are equally likely to work in any given shift and with any given peer.
Given the assumption that the shifts and pool of peers in each week are randomly assigned, the error n it η is exogenous in equation (1); therefore, controlling for jt Z , ˆi t Y can be identified from the average hourly sales in the week. 13 Then, based on the first assumption, the correlations between the change of abilities,
, and the salesperson's own work experience and peer interactions in the previous week, can be used to infer the learning effect since our framework has monotonic relationships between learning, salesperson knowledge and ability. The correct inference, however, requires us to address several identification concerns. First, if salespeople with high learning ability are more likely to work more hours, the correlation between
and work experience will be an upward-biased estimate of the true relationship. This is not an issue, however, because our random shift assignment ensures that work hours across salespeople are not significantly different, except for long leaves that are exogenous to salesperson learning ability.
The reflection problem, stating that two workers might simultaneously impact each other's productivity (Manski 1993) , is a major issue in identifying the effect of peer interactions on worker ability because estimates might reflect both directions of peer effects. Our study, however, investigates how a worker's productivity is influenced by peer ability that is lagged one week. As Manski acknowledges, this type of dynamic model does not suffer the same reflection problem as 12 Consequently, we should treat the effect of peer-based learning and learning-by-doing on sales in our empirical model as the carry-over effect from the last week. Learning in the current week cannot be separated from the competitive or cooperative relationship with peers who are working together in the same week. 13 Otherwise, we cannot distinguish from data whether higher sales are due to higher selling ability, assigning shifts with high demand, or working together with lower-ability competitive peers. contemporaneous models so long as the time lag is appropriately determined. We also note that Figure   2 shows the productivity of new salespeople to be time-varying. That is, our data is not at the stable temporal equilibrium, a necessary condition for identifying peer effects in dynamic models (Manski 1993, p. 540) . Furthermore, because the peer interaction precedes the productivity change, correlations are not due to contemporary peers at the same or nearby counters.
Another identification concern is mean reversion --a salesperson may experience lower sales when working with star peers in the current week, with sales recovering the next week when she works with other, lower-ability salespeople. In such an explanation, what appears to be productivity growth is really mean reversion from a negative contemporaneous peer effect in the prior period. A simple peer effects model helps to illustrate why this potential identification problem is unlikely to fully explain peer ability impacting long-term productivity growth in our setting given our pseudo-random worker assignment. 
Addressing Endogenous Hiring in a Simple Regression Model
Finally, we are concerned that salespeople are endogenously selected based on attributes unobservable to the researcher that will influence productivity growth after being hired. This potential problem can be illustrated using a simple model. Assume that in each week t the ability of a salesperson i, ˆi t y , is dynamically accumulated as follows: y is a parameter of the unobserved attributes that determines salesperson i's selling ability before employment.
Worker selection could bias the estimate of θ in two ways. First, if a firm selects salespeople with higher ,0i y , the regression will wrongly infer the firm's new salespeople have faster productivity growth and, since they work with other high-ability salespeople at the same counter, obtain an upwardbiased estimate of θ for working with high-ability peers. Second, if a firm is able to select salespeople with higher i λ , new salespeople are also more likely to have peers with high ability. By similar reasoning the regression may obtain an upward-biased estimate of θ for working with high-ability peers.
14 Alternatively, we may include both t h and 1 t h − in the regression. As long as they are not perfectly correlated, 1 θ and 1 α can be separately recovered.
To examine whether the potential salesperson ability change in our data is indeed driven by peer interactions instead of worker selection and hiring, we run a first difference regression using (3) and (4), we obtain:
In the equation, we have differenced out and hence controlled for heterogeneity in initial salesperson ability. The remaining selection issue is heterogeneity in i λ , which we address in two ways.
First, we directly estimate i λ using our panel data. By doing so our setup is equivalent to a differencein-differences regression. Second, we also use firm fixed effects to control for selection. Since the ability of firms to attract salespeople with different learning potential should be relatively time-invariant, the worker selection issue will be mitigated by estimating these fixed effects.
Among the 53 newly-hired salespeople in the data, six quit within the first three months. Their average hourly sales were far below those who stayed longer. We are concerned that these early exits may create another selection issue. To examine how the early quitters impact our results, we use two sets of data in our regression: the whole sample and one using only salespeople whose tenure was longer than three months. Finally, we also interact , 1
i t − h in equation (5) with the indicators of the second and third month of employment, to account for the fact that the effect of peer interactions may not be stable over time as a salesperson's ability grows.
Regression results are presented in Table 3 with robust standard errors clustered by salesperson.
The main effect of peer interactions on sales ("ln(hours with high-ability peers last week)" and "ln(hours with low-ability peers last week)" for both within-counter and cross-counter cases) is consistent in sign and magnitude across the four specifications, suggesting that including salesperson or counter fixed effects and using different samples do not substantially impact our results. In a new salesperson's first month, a one percent increase in hours working with high-ability peers at the same counter in the previous week leads to about 0.4 percent gains in productivity in the current week. The model preserves the gain in future weeks. This effect declines with tenure, although the decline is only significant in the third month in the first and second specifications, implying that the salesperson is impacted less by peers as she gains ability. Working with low-ability peers at the same counter in the first month has a negative effect on productivity growth that is marginally significant in the third and fourth specifications, but the magnitude is far smaller than the positive effect from working with high-ability peers. Table 3 also illustrates the long-term benefit of working with high-ability peers at adjacent counters -in the first month of employment, a one percent increase in hours with high-ability salespeople at competing counters in the previous week leads to 0.15 to 0.24 percent productivity gains in the current and future weeks. This effect, although declining across subsequent months, is still quite substantial in the second and third month. Working with low-ability salespeople at other counters, however, does not impact productivity growth. In summary, these results provide clear initial evidence of the positive and permanent impact to new salespeople of working longer in the previous week with high-ability peers at the same and adjacent counters, which is consistent with the learning mechanism but different from the contemporary peer effects in the literature (Mas and Moretti 2009; Chan, Li, and Pierce 2013) . The results are not due to the endogenous worker hiring as the model has controlled for worker heterogeneity. Figure 3 and Table 3 presented initial evidence of the effect of peer interactions on newly-hired salespeople learning. Based on the learning mechanisms we have examined, we now build a more comprehensive model that incorporates the relative impact of peer-based learning, learning-by-doing, and forgetting on new salesperson productivity growth. We specify peer-based learning as a function of not only the number of work hours but also the difference in ability between the salesperson and her peers. Therefore, the magnitude of learning will change over time as the salesperson's ability grows, offering a rationale for our findings in Table 3 that the effect of working with high-ability peers decreases over time. In our model, we further extend these specifications to examine the learning of incumbent salespeople as well.
IV. A Comprehensive Learning Model
Modeling Peer-Based Learning, Learning-by-Doing, and Forgetting
In our analysis, a salesperson's peers are defined as all other cosmetics salespeople who either work at the same counter (within-counter peers or inside peers) or work in any adjacent counter (cross-counter peers or outside peers). 16 We use a reduced-form approximation to model how the (logged) ability ˆi t y in equation (3) N , respectively. We assume thatˆi t y in week t is affected by peer interactions in the previous week t-1. Since salespeople work with different peers in different hours throughout the week, we first specify the peer interaction at the hour level. We assume that ˆi t y is affected by the difference between her ability and the ability of peers. We further assume that ˆi t y is affected by the average of those ability differences in any hour h the salesperson works. 17 We then aggregate these hourly interactions to the week level and normalize by the total work hours of i in week 16 Salespeople at distant counters cannot be directly observed or interacted with during work time therefore their techniques are difficult to learn. Chan, Li, and Pierce (2013) show from the same data source that cross-counter peer effects rapidly diminish with distance between counters.
17 Since ˆi t y is the log of ˆi t Y , the differences measure the log of the ratio of abilities of two salespeople.
t, , 1
i t H − . Suppose the effect is positive. By working fewer hours in a week, a newly-hired salesperson's ability growth suffers as she learns less from peers, affecting her sales not only in the next week but also in weeks after. Also, as the salesperson's ability improves, learning from peers will diminish. Given that i's ability will similarly affect the learning of her peers k, her ability change will in turn influence k's productivity change in the week after. As a result, the productivity change of all salespeople, within and across counters, will be dynamically correlated with one another.
Previous studies have typically modeled learning-by-doing by using past production as a proxy for past experience (e.g., Benkard 2000) . However, if we used past sales, a high-ability salesperson would always have higher work experience than her peers, even though they had worked the same number of
hours. Yet a salesperson may improve her skills through repeated customer interaction and activity experimentation even though this does not always generate sales; therefore, we assume that a salesperson's ability growth is affected by (the log of) the total number of hours she worked in the previous week, , 1 i t h − . Finally, we model forgetting as the fraction of ability lost from last week if the salesperson did not work. Based on the above discussion, we specifyˆi t y as follows:
In this dynamic setup, , 1i t y − in the previous week carries over to ˆi t y in the current week, implying that level of knowledge or ability has a long-term impact on future sales. The parameter γ , which captures knowledge carry-over, implies forgetting or depreciation in ability with any estimate less than 1. Parameters 1 θ and 2 θ represent within-counter and cross-counter peer-based learning, respectively. The parameter λ captures learning-by-doing from work experience. Finally, it τ is an error term representing "learning shocks" that are not captured in our model (e.g. the salesperson may enroll in a training course). The major difference between the learning shocks and demand shocks on sales is that the former will be carried over to future periods (as capital of knowledge) and the latter will not.
This model is different from previous studies on contemporary peer effects since the current effect from peers on ˆi t y will impact ˆi s y in any future week s.
Suppose that there are I salespeople. We then have I simultaneous equations (6) 
Due to learning, t ε ε ε ε is serially correlated for each salesperson through τ's across periods. This implies that we have to allow for a general structure of heteroskedasticity for t ε ε ε ε in our estimation.
Model Estimation
A challenge of estimating the model is that it is dynamic and non-linear. The Θ 's of different weeks are functions of unknown parameters γ , 1 θ , and 2 θ (see equation (8)). In equation (10) As we noted, t ε ε ε ε is a function of t h − Θ , implying a model with heteroskedasticity of errors. In particular, the longer a salesperson works in our data period the larger the magnitude of var( ) t ε ε ε ε because of the unobserved learning accumulated from past periods. Subsequently, we compute the robust standard errors clustered at the individual salesperson level for the NLS estimator.
Extending Model to Asymmetric Learning
Our model thus far is "symmetric" in the sense that the θ 's do not differentiate between working with high-and low-ability peers. This may not be consistent with the learning mechanism in the previous section. To relax this restriction, we construct an asymmetric model of peer-based learning. y y > based on the estimates, and find them consistent for all i and t.
In both the symmetric and asymmetric models, we allow the magnitude of learning-by-doing and peer-based learning for new salespeople to differ from those for incumbents. A new salesperson may benefit more from learning thus have stronger incentives to learn from peers. We classify a salesperson as new for her first three months at the store. 20 We then allow the learning-by-doing and the peer-based learning parameters to be different between new and incumbent salespeople in our models.
The Consistency of Model Estimation
In this section, we first discuss the data used in estimating our parameters. In the first week of employment, new salespeople have not been exposed to peer-based learning and learning-by-doing. For incumbent salespeople, their initial sales or productivity captures all past learning before our sample 20 We have also tested other specifications (e.g. the first month) and find that results are qualitatively the same.
period starts. In either case, sales in the first week can be used to estimate the initial ability 1 y . The identification of the learning-by-doing and forgetting parameters comes from the accumulation of a salesperson's work experience. The former implies that a salesperson's average hourly sales will increase with accumulated work hours, holding other factors constant. On the other hand, forgetting will be inferred if we observe that hourly sales decrease after working for fewer hours in previous period.
Salesperson leaves of absence in our data therefore can identify this parameter. Finally, variation in the pool of peers every week will identify peer-based learning within and across counters. This variation is mainly due to the policy of shift assignment at the store. The counter relocation in the middle of our sample period also brings a change in the pool of peers the salesperson faces.
As we stated, the nested optimization procedure that we adopt to estimate our models is a NLS estimator. It only differs from a non-linear simultaneous estimation procedure in numerical implementation. The criterion functions are the same (i.e., minimizing the sum of squared errors) and the estimates from both procedures equivalent. Analogous to the identification condition we discussed in Section 3.1, the consistency of this NLS estimator relies on the random shift assignment in our setting. Let t X be the covariates on the right side of equation (10) . From the expression of t ε ε ε ε (see equation (11)), we have: To further examine the consistency issue we run a simulation study. We assume that τ's and η's in equation (10) are normally distributed and independent from the worker assignment in previous periods. We simulate sales for each salesperson in each period, based on the assumed model parameters and the worker shift assignment in data. Results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of the Appendix Table A3 , showing that our NLS estimates are very close to the "true" parameters.
V. Results
The results from our models are presented in Table 4 . Column 1 presents our symmetric learning model (Model 1). First of all, the ability of peers, both within and across counters, clearly impacts a salesperson's weekly sales growth. This effect is in particular prominent for the newly-hired salespeople. Second, the within-counter effect is 4-5 times larger than the cross-counter effect for new salespeople. This result is consistent with the peer-based learning mechanism: salespeople can more closely observe within-counter peers and solicit active teaching and advice. Peer teaching is unlikely to occur across counters since they are competing against one other and are compensated based on sales.
Still, the significant cross-counter effect suggests that by closely locating to a competing counter with star salespeople, salespeople can improve their ability and productivity through the observation of competitor sales techniques. While sales may be immediately hurt because of competition, the longterm benefit for the counter is substantial. In addition, while the effects for new salespeople are much higher, the significant coefficients for existing salespeople imply that there is still opportunity for experienced salespeople to further improve when working with star salespeople.
Our results also show that working longer hours in the prior week will increase a new salesperson's ability, consistent with learning-by-doing. The ability carry-over parameter γ, is less than but not statistically different from one, suggesting no knowledge depreciation in our context. 21 , 22 More importantly, our results quantify and show the relative importance of each source of learning. Based on the estimates in Model 1, a new salesperson, after working 40 hours in the first week, experiences ability growth from learning-by-doing of about two percent. In contrast, if she also worked at the same counter with a peer of twice her ability all the time, her ability would grow by an additional five percent.
If there were another peer twice her ability at a competing counter, her ability would further grow by one percent. 23 Given that the worker exit rate is 44 percent in the data, learning-by-doing alone may not be sufficient to compensate for the high employee turnover. Our findings suggest that the major contributing factor for the observed worker learning curves is peer-based learning. Many incumbent salespeople whose ability is below the median are still more knowledgeable than new salespeople, thus the effects are still positive.
-------------------------------------------------------------PLACE TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE -------------------------------------------------------------
Further Model Extensions and Results on Peer-Based Learning
We further explore our data in this section to examine whether our findings are indeed driven by peer-based learning. As discussed earlier, the store has four cosmetics brands using team-based commissions (TC) and seven using individual-based commissions (IC). While these incentives cannot be treated as exogenous, they provide insight into the learning mechanism behind productivity growth.
To explore this, we separately estimate the asymmetric model for new salespeople for IC and TC counters. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 show that own work experience for new salespeople is higher in IC counters than in TC counters. We also observe stronger cross-counter peer effect for IC counters. This is consistent with the explanation that stronger individual incentives in IC counters may increase the learning effort. Although the positive effects from within-counter superiors are similar for the two compensations systems, they may reflect two countervailing incentives. While IC induces salespeople to put more effort on learning, it motivates less effort toward teaching. In contrast, while TC motivates peers to actively teach, IC salespeople in general have weaker incentives to devote effort to learn.
The positive effects from within-counter superiors at IC counters help rule out an alternative explanation --the identified productivity growth reflects new salespeople gaining long-term customers when working with high-ability peers. There are strong financial incentives for IC salespeople to compete for customers. Chan, Li, and Pierce (2013) use data from the same source demonstrating that at IC counters, working with superior peers reduces a salesperson's current sales. If sharing customers between salespeople drove our findings, we would not observe the same positive effects from IC counters. Similarly, customer sharing cannot explain the positive effects from cross-counter peers.
Next, we investigate how knowledge transfer between salespeople depends on job task difficulty.
We examine the two cosmetic sub-categories, skin care and makeup, discussed in previous sections.
Skin care products are much more difficult to sell than makeup. We re-run our asymmetric Model 3 for new salespeople using a salesperson's average hourly skincare and makeup sales as dependent variables.
We present these in columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 , respectively. Peer effects remain the most important predictors of weekly productivity gains for both types of products, but the differences in the coefficients suggest that the learning process is not identical. Within-counter effects from superiors are much stronger for skin care, while cross-counter effects from superiors are stronger for makeup.
These results are consistent with the difference between learning based on observing peers and learning through active teaching. Knowledge transfer across firm boundaries is unlikely to involve active teaching given the competition between the firms, 25 and is mostly likely to occur through observation. Skin care products are more brand-specific, making learning from other counters less feasible. The much stronger within-counter effect, compared to the cross-counter effect, suggests that new salespeople need active help from peers to learn how to pitch difficult products to consumers. For makeup products, the magnitude similarity of learning from inside and outside superiors suggests that learning to sell makeup may occur mainly through observation.
An alternative explanation to knowledge transfer is that the improvement in productivity comes from adopting the work ethic of superior peers. 26 If this were the case, however, there would be no reason why the learning effects in makeup and skin care should differ. Since the impact of observing work ethic within-counter and cross-counter is similar for makeup sales, one cannot explain the large difference between these two effects for skin care sales. Suppose observing work ethic from crosscounter peers is more difficult than from within-counter peers, and hence the cross-counter effect is negligible for the skin care category, we should also find such asymmetry in the makeup category. 
Qualitative Evidence of Peer-Based Learning
Identifying the causality and mechanisms of peer-based learning in the workplace is challenging due to endogeneity issues and unobservable behavior in our data. In the previous sections, we have presented evidence that casts doubt on alternative explanations for our estimation results that include customer loyalty, work ethic, and mean reversion. To further support our conclusions, we conducted two focus groups where we interviewed cosmetic salespeople in both our data source store in China and at the Saks Fifth Avenue in Indianapolis, U.S.A. The results of these focus groups strongly support our interpretation of teaching and observational learning. Salespeople unanimously indicated acute awareness of the actions of their coworkers at the same counter. Eight out of nine interviewees also affirmed their observations of peers at nearby counters. Salespeople repeatedly emphasized the importance of coworkers in learning, particularly for new hires. Many of them argued that management underestimated the importance of the coworkers chosen to work with new hires. Although these studies by no means prove the learning mechanisms that we argue, they are consistent with and complement the evidence provided in our data.
Counterfactual Experiments
To show the managerial implications of our results, we execute two counterfactual experiments examining how turnover and shift assignment can impact new salesperson ability growth. We first examine turnover, which destroys opportunities for knowledge transfer, and thus productivity growth or maintenance, within the firm (Becker 1962; Ton and Huckman 2008) . In our data, a new salesperson Table 4 . Her ability after three months is CNY216.2 per hour and stabilizes after that.
In the alternative scenario, we assume that B is retained and instead another salesperson C with lower ability (CNY169.3 per hour) exits, such that the total number of peers remains constant. We assume that B works the same hours as C. The ability growth of A is presented in the middle bars under "retention scenario". The total growth in the three months would be CNY165.19 per hour, representing CNY68.07 per hour higher growth than the original scenario. This effect also extends to competitors. In our example, counter 3 is adjacent to counters 1, 2, and 9 (see Figure 1 ). In the second month after B leaves, a new salesperson at counter 2 replaces another salesperson, and in the third month another joined at counter 1. By retaining B, the ability of these new salespeople is also enhanced.
We calculate the total expected sales revenue of each of the salespeople at counters 1, 2, and 9 who are employed throughout the entire experiment period from the first to the third month. The right bars in Figure 4 (a) show the differences between the original and hypothetical scenarios. The total three-month increased benefits of retaining B for competing counters is CNY36.45 per hour.
This exercise highlights the economic value from retaining high-ability salespeople, not only from their own productivity, but also from enhancing peer-based learning for new workers. The total sales increase at counter 3 due to learning from B is about 17 percent of B's own productivity, implying the value of observational learning and teaching from peers (counter 3 uses TC). Since this spillover effect is not fully compensated by commissions, to retain B the brand (manufacturer firm) must offer extra financial reward (e.g., end-of-year bonus based on annual sales). Furthermore, the sales increase in other counters is about nine percent of B's productivity, demonstrating the significance of observational learning (since teaching is unlikely among competing peers). Although the ability growth of outside workers does not directly benefit counter 3, total sales of the cosmetic category likely increase, making this important for the department store. Because this benefit is not rewarded by the brand, the department store may need to offer additional bonuses in order to retain star salespeople.
If salesperson B cannot be retained, what can the brand do to improve the new salesperson's learning? In the second experiment, we examine the relative performance of different shift assignments and demonstrate its value for learning. We compare three shift assignment scenarios in the first three months (12 weeks) after the new salesperson A from counter 3 is hired. In addition to C, A has two other coworkers in the counter, D and E. The abilities of the four salespeople in the first week are CNY119.6, CNY169.3, CNY266.3, and CNY357.8, respectively. The first scenario randomly assigns the four salespeople into the three shifts, one in Shift 1, two in Shift 2, and the other one in Shift 3, similar to the true store policy. In the second scenario, A is always assigned to work in Shift 2 together with E, her peer with the highest ability. C and D are rotationally assigned into Shift 1 and 3. Therefore, A is exposed to learning from all peers every day (half of the time she works with C and E, and the other half with D and E). In the last scenario, C and D are always assigned into Shift 2, while A and E are rotationally assigned into Shift 1 and 3. Thus, A works alone for half of the time and the other half with less productive peers C and D. We assume that shift assignments at other counters are random in all the three scenarios. Figure 4(b) shows that the ability change of A is remarkably different across the three scenarios, with the difference between the best and the worst case as large as 94%. Furthermore, by pairing with E, A's total growth in the three months is about CNY200, even higher than the growth from retaining the star salesperson B in the previous experiment.
This exercise illustrates our finding that team heterogeneity has long-term benefit to workers and firms. Compared with the first and last scenarios, staffing a team with a mix of star salespeople and inexperienced rookies can improve peer-based learning over random or homogeneous assignments and thus achieve a much faster growth in sales. This finding is consistent to the empirical results in Hamilton et al. (2003) , Mas and Moretti (2009), and Pierce (2013) , but it suggests a much longer benefit from team heterogeneity, as salesperson A's knowledge and sales in the second scenario will remain at the high level after three months.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
This study identifies individual-level peer-based learning that drives salesperson productivity growth. This occurs both within and across firm boundaries, and their magnitudes depend on the ability of both the source peer and the recipient of the knowledge. It is crucial for a new salesperson to work with more productive workers when she starts. Learning-by-doing also plays a fairly important role. In contrast, forgetting has little impact on the salesperson's productivity growth in our study. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to quantify and decompose the underlying sources of individual learning in a workplace.
While we cannot assert the mechanism through which learning occurs, the differential importance of learning from inside and outside peers suggests that salespeople learn from both observation and the active teaching of peers, with the latter mechanism unlikely to occur across firm boundaries. The difference in the magnitude of learning when selling skin care vs. makeup products suggests that active teaching from peers is critical to the learning of difficult tasks, while observation of high-ability peers may be sufficient for simpler ones. The relationship between peer-based learning and compensation also suggests that incentives may impact effort toward learning and teaching, although we must be cautious in our interpretation due to endogenous compensation systems. We have also argued that the identified peer-based learning is likely to involve knowledge transfers and not entirely from factors such as adopting the work ethic of superior peers, gaining loyal customers, or others.
Future research must explore how job task and workplace characteristics impact the roles of learning-by-doing vs. peer-based learning in settings other than cosmetic sales. Learning-by-doing may play a bigger role in more standardized job tasks with fewer parameters, and in those where speed and precision are the primary concerns (e.g. farm and factory production). Furthermore, although the retail technology in our data has remained constant throughout the sample period, learning curves may also be influenced by improvements to production processes or technology (Hatch and Mowery 1998) .
In addition, we have not been able to fully investigate the conditions that facilitate knowledge transfer between salespeople. Our finding of asymmetric peer-based learning between IC and TC counters suggests that financial incentives may be crucial for salespeople to invest effort in learning and teaching. Other factors that may impact worker interaction include physical proximity and group identity of workers in the same or different firms, individual worker personality, and organizational culture. To what extent these factors facilitate peer-based learning and how they affect firm productivity growth must be addressed by future research. 
Tests of Random Worker Assignment
A.1 Establishing Equal Staffing Assignments
Our empirical models of peer-based learning primarily rely on exogenous variation in peer assignment during new salespersons' initial weeks. 1 We examine the shift assignment pattern, first comparing and testing the difference between the average weekly work hours of new salespeople in their first twelve weeks with that of all other salespeople in the data. Test 1 in Table A1 Table A1 again reveal no significant differences. We conclude that new salespeople are assigned to shifts in the same way as experienced salespeople. Note that the standard deviations of working hours for the three shifts are large, indicating substantial variations in shift assignments across weeks, a condition necessary for the inference of worker learning from the data.
-------------------------------------------------------------PLACE TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE -------------------------------------------------------------
A.2 Establishing the Exogeneity of Peer Assignment
Estimated peer-based learning effects may be biased if the hours that new salespeople work with peers are strategically assigned. For example, if a new salesperson with high learning potential is more likely to be paired with star salespeople, we may wrongly infer that the stars positively influenced her productivity growth. Since the rotating shift assignment equally assigns workers to shifts, this endogeneity issue should not exist in our setting.
categories based on their long-term productivity and the median hourly revenue at each counter. We then examine the percentage of hours that a new salesperson works with high-and low-ability salespeople at her counter in the early periods of employment. We present these data in Figure A1 , which shows the mean percentage of hours that new salespeople are assigned to high-ability peers in each of their first 25 weeks of employment. These high-ability peer frequencies consistently average around 50 percent. To further rule out that salespeople are strategically assigned to high-or low-ability peers, Figure A2 presents the average time with high-ability peers across all weeks for the 47 new salespeople who stay longer than three months in the data. Again, the averages are very close to 50 percent but the standard deviations show considerable variation for any given salesperson, which will be important for identification. Finally, the last two columns in Table A1 show that the percentage of time new salespeople work with high-and low-ability peers at every counter is near 50 percent. These figures and tables show that every new salesperson at every counter in every week has an equal chance to work with high-ability and low-ability peers.
------------------------------------------------------------------PLACE FIGURES A1 AND A2 ABOUT HERE -------------------------------------------------------------------
We follow this with formal t-tests of differences in the hours that new salespeople work with high-and low-ability peers. Tests 1 and 2 in Table A2 present the within-and cross-counter test results, showing that when averaged across weeks and across salespeople the percentages are similar within and across counters. Both tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the amount of time worked with highability peers is the same as the amount worked with low-ability peers.
We further test whether new salespeople are consistently paired with peers based on peer ability. Test 3 in Table A2 tests whether, conditional on a salesperson working more hours with highability within-counter peers last week, the hours with high-ability and low-ability peers in the current week are equal. Test 4 is conditional on working more hours with low-ability within-counter peers last week. Tests 5 and 6 repeat these for peers at adjacent counters. Table A2 shows that the average hours with either type of peers are statistically indistinguishable, which would not be the case if new salespeople were consistently paired with peers based on their learning potential. For example, if a new salesperson with a high learning potential is more likely to be paired with high-ability peers, we should find a statistically significant difference in Test 3. Consequently, we conclude there is no evidence of strategic scheduling of new salespeople with certain types of peers. 
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